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WOULD THE UNITED STATES DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR BE
JUSTIFIED AS A UNITED NATIONS DOCTRINE?
Harry van der Linden
On the same day, 23 September 2003, that President George W. Bush defended his
Iraq policy to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Secretary-General Kofi
Annan also spoke to the Assembly. Annan reiterated his opposition to the view that states
may independently be justified in using military force “preemptively” to avoid the
dangers posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among states and
terrorists, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. He added:
But it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the
concerns that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns
that drive them to take unilateral action. We must show that those concerns can, and
will, be addressed effectively through collective action.1
Accordingly, Annan proposed that the members of the United Nations Security
Council “may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of
coercive measures to address some types of threats—for instance, terrorist groups armed
with weapons of mass destruction.” The Secretary-General promised to establish a “highlevel panel of eminent personalities” with the task of addressing the new security
concerns. He requested the panel examine standards for collective humanitarian
intervention and consider how to reform the United Nations and make the Security
Council more representative. Emphasizing the importance of these issues, Annan said,
“Excellencies, we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less
decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded.”2
While Annan did not mention the United States by name, he obviously attacked the
idea of unilateral preemptive war as defended in the National Security Strategy of the
United States of America (NSS), issued in September 2002 and implemented by the Bush
Administration in its war against Iraq.3 President Bush had previously suggested the need
for preemptive war in the post-11 September 2001 world in his State of the Union
Address of 2002 and in his graduation speech at West Point in June of the same year.
Preemptive war as construed by the Bush Administration is more accurately called
“preventive war.” Many commentators and scholars of international relations have
criticized the Bush doctrine of “preemptive” war, but have paid little attention to the issue
raised by Annan’s speech. (One exception is John W. Lango’s “Preventive Wars, Just
War Principles, and the United Nations,” upon which I commented at the Central
Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 2003.4) Would a doctrine
of preventive war to meet the threats posed by WMD be morally defensible as a
collective doctrine? Should the Security Council have the authority to initiate preventive
wars in response to emerging WMD threats?

My aim here is to show that even though some of the main objections to unilateral
preventive war are not, or are to a lesser degree, applicable to collective preventive war, it
still would be a mistake for the United Nations to adopt this doctrine. I will defend my
view on basis of the just war tradition. I will first articulate and assess the Bush doctrine
of preventive war, and discuss how United Nations-authorized preventive war is less
objectionable than its unilateralist variant.
1. The Bush Doctrine of Preventive War
The NSS argues that we have arrived at a historical turning point in that the
security tasks of the government have fundamentally changed. In an apparent reference to
11 September 2001, President Bush states in the Introduction to NSS that in the past only
enemies with “great armies and great industrial capabilities” were able to threaten the
national security of the United States, whereas now “shadowy networks of individuals
can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single
tank.”
Strictly speaking, the possibility described by the NSS that terrorists would “turn
the power of modern technologies against us” existed long before 11 September. 11
September only vividly and tragically brought this possibility to the awareness of the
public. The security policy statement continues to point out that the “gravest danger”
facing the United States is that “our enemies” would acquire WMD. These enemies
include “terrorists of global reach,” who commit “premeditated, politically motivated
violence . . . against innocents,” and a small number of “rogue states” that emerged in the
1990s. What characterizes these states is that they sponsor global terrorism, seek to
acquire WMD and may make them available to terrorist groups that they harbor or
sponsor, reject the United States and its liberal values, brutalize their people, and have
engaged in aggressive conduct and even war against their neighbors.5
The NSS offers a variety of broad strategies of dealing with the new security
concerns, including reducing poverty through free trade and markets, promoting
democracy and the rule of law, strengthening alliances against terrorism, and preventing
regional conflicts through negotiation. It also seeks to more effectively track and
intercept the export or traffic of WMD materials and knowledge. Most controversially, it
argues that a new military response is necessary.
Noting that “traditional concepts of deterrence” will not work against global
terrorists who “seek martyrdom in death” and rogue states that sponsor them, the NSS
maintains that the old notion of preemption must be adapted to the new security situation
of the United States. In the past, international law allowed a first strike when an attack
was imminent. Unambiguous measures of when a threat became imminent were patent:
for example, troops would mobilize at the border or the air force would start preparing for
attack. Today, we must expect that attacks against the United States by rogue states and
terrorists will be nonconventional, sudden, undertaken with easily concealed weapons,
and potentially disastrous when WMD are used. The NSS concludes:

The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as
to the time and place of the enemy’s attack (emphasis added). To forestall or prevent
such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively.6
The NSS continues, when the “enemies of civilization” seek WMD, the United States
“cannot remain idle while dangers gather.” The adaptation of the traditional preemption
doctrine, then, involves that the Bush Administration has embraced what is more
accurately called a doctrine of preventive war, which holds that to attack is just, even if
when and where a great threat will materialize is doubtful. The doctrine is also
unilateralist. The NSS states, “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise
our right to self-defense by acting preemptively against . . . terrorists [and] by convincing
or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities [of not supporting terrorists
in any way].”7
The crucial difference between preemption and prevention lies in the certainty and
immediacy of the threat. As put in a recent discussion of the Bush security doctrine,
“preemption . . . is nothing more than a quick draw” (in a gun fight), while “preventive
war is based on the concept that war is inevitable, and that it is better to fight now while
the costs are low than later when the costs are high.”8 In the case of preventive war, the
perception of the inevitability of war might be wrong and contribute to its occurrence,
while in the case of preemption the threat is undeniably present, ready to be unleashed,
and only force can meet it. A classic example of a preventive strike is Israel’s bombing in
1981 of an Iraqi nuclear plant under construction at Osiraq. On the assumption that Israel
had convincing evidence that Egypt would attack, which is nowadays no longer held to
be the case, its first strike against Egypt in the Six Day War of 1967 fits the notion of
preemption.
In the “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” published in
December 2002, the Bush Administration also embraces preventive war, calling it
preemptive war. Again, since deterrence against terrorists and their state sponsors may
not be successful, “preemptive measures” may be necessary. This requires the military to
have “capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons
are used.”9 Recent claims made by the Bush Administration about the threats posed by
Syria and Iran, and how these threats may be met by military force, illustrate that the
concept of preventive war guides this administration. The concept was also pivotal in the
Bush Administration official defense of its war against Iraq.
The NSS appears to justify using preventive military force against a variety of poorly
distinguished targets. They include (1) states that are in the process of acquiring or
further developing WMD and fail to respect broadly recognized international norms, (2)
states that might enable terrorist organizations to acquire WMD in the near future, (3)
states that harbor or support terrorists of global reach, (4) global terrorists that seek to
develop WMD, and (5) global terrorists. What is confusing about the account of
preventive war in the NSS is that only (1) and possibly (2), depending on its more

detailed specification, involve preventive military force. Military force in (4) and (5) is
defensive. This is so because the terrorists that are targeted by the Bush doctrine declared
war on the United States and its allies many years prior to 11 September 2001. Seeking to
prevent our enemies from harming us is not a preventive act if hostilities already have
been declared.10 The William J. Clinton administration was already involved against the
war on global terrorism. The term “war” is a misnomer here in that combating terrorism
is mainly a matter of intelligence work, legal measures, and police work; it may involve
limited military strikes, but those do not add up to war as commonly understood, as
conflict involving the use of military force on a large scale, typically between states. Case
(3) involves extending military force directed against the terrorists to the state that
harbors or protects them. This would still be an instance of defensive military force, but
we will see that it would seldom be justified because the harm it would bring about would
likely be disproportionate to its possible benefits.
Prior United States presidential administrations have recognized this point, but not the
Bush Administration: the NSS boldly asserts, “We make no distinction between terrorists
and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.” This suggests that war may be
rightfully waged at any time against states that have global terrorists on their territory.
The concept of terrorists of global reach is not well-defined (the only example given is alQaeda), leaving open the possibility that the Bush Administration aims to justify that the
United States has the right to wage war at any moment against states of its choosing that
are linked to terrorism in general. The war against terrorism is a war without a definite
end because, as the NSS declares, progress will only come “through the persistent
accumulation of successes.”11
I am mainly concerned here about Bush’s security doctrine as a preventive war
doctrine, directly aiming at political regime change through military force to avoid
expected future WMD threats. This is also what the NSS emphasizes most and how
Annan appears to interpret the Bush doctrine. I assume that Annan also wishes the
Security Council to consider adopting only a United Nations version of this more
narrowly interpreted Bush doctrine, even though he gives the misleading example of
early United Nations authorization of force against global terrorists with WMD. On any
reasonable account of self-defense, we may use multilateral and even unilateral force
against terrorists in possession of such weapons. States that actively protect these
terrorists may become legitimate targets of a self-defensive war if it is the only way to
meet the terrorist WMD threat. The real controversial issue is whether states may wage
preventive war against states that might in the future provide terrorists with these
weapons.
The war against Iraq shows how unilateral preventive war can easily be a cover
for aggression. The Bush Administration did not heed its warning in the NSS against the
danger that “nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression.”12 This war was not
preventive, humanitarian, or self-defensive, leaving the option that it was aggressive. Iraq
under pressure allowed inspections of its suspected WMD sites, had no WMD that posed
a threat to its neighbors (let alone the United States), was not recently trying to develop

these weapons on a large scale, lacked the resources for doing so, and had proven to be
responsive to deterrence.
The humanitarian case for war was also weak in that Saddam Hussein’s
oppressive and brutal regime in recent years had no genocidal policies against its people,
while any argument of reactive self-defense was implausible in that Iraq did not harbor
many terrorists with declared aggressive intentions toward the United States.
Incompetence of intelligence or the culpable failure to seek or accept the relevant facts
might factor into the act of aggression against Iraq, but growing evidence indicates that
the United States deliberately and intentionally pursued war for the sake of serving the
economic and geopolitical interests of the United States.13
The imperial and hegemonic rhetoric of the NSS accentuates the worry that the
doctrine of preventive war may function as a pretext for aggression. It proclaims that a
“single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise,”
exists and commits the United States to bring this model “to every corner of the world.”14
The Bush security statement holds that the realization of this goal would bring lasting
security. In the meantime, national interest and the promotion of security require that “we
must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge,” “dissuade future military
competition,” and create new “bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and
Northeast Asia.”15
This process of creating new military posts is well on its way in Eastern Europe,
the Caspian Sea region, and the Persian Gulf region. No wonder, then, that the global
community has reacted with distrust and disapproval of the Bush preventive war doctrine,
a tool of expanding and maintaining United States hegemony. The situation is made
worse by the NSS leaving the possibility open that the war on terrorism is a preventive
war without a definite end and one that may be waged against all states harboring or
sponsoring terrorism.
The doctrine of unilateral preventive war has a strong destabilizing effect. As
Annan put it in his recent speech to the General Assembly, if all nations would “reserve
the right to act unilaterally,” we might see “a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless
use of force.” The problem is not only that there would be an increase in aggressive wars
under the cloak of prevention, but also that nations sincerely might have distorted
perceptions of when such wars might be justified. Longstanding conflicts between
nations lead to distorted perceptions of the other nation’s aims and intentions, and a
unilateralist universe has no requirement that we seek to correct such perceptions through
international dialogue. The result may be especially disastrous in the case of conflicts
between nations with WMD capabilities.
A final objection to the Bush doctrine is that it violates international law. The
NSS obscures this fact by equating preemptive war and preventive war and then by
arguing that traditional international law allows the first. Preventive war has always been
a violation of customary international law, while with the adoption of the United Nations
Charter even unilateral preemptive war may no longer be legal. Its article 51 allows

unilateral military force only in the case of “self-defense [against] an armed attack.” But
perhaps a case can be made that since the Charter does not explicitly reject prior
customary international law on this score it may be assumed that self-defense includes
narrowly defined anticipatory self-defense—preemption in the strict sense—and is not
limited to reactive self-defense only.
2. The Lesser Evil of a Collective Preventive War Doctrine
These objections to a doctrine of preventive war are primarily objections to
unilateral resort to preventive war and to the United States in particular acting on this
principle. It leaves the possibility open that United Nations authorized— collective or
multilateral—preventive war against states might be justified as a response to future
WMD threats. United Nations-authorized preventive war would reduce the worries of
escalation and of preventive war as pretext for aggression. Once the decision to initiate
preventive war is placed in the hands of the Security Council ulterior motives or distorted
perceptions are less likely to determine the decision making process because of the
impact of dialogic interaction. As proponents of discourse ethics and deliberative
democracy have shown, through dialogic interaction, limited and particular perspectives
can be overcome, so that the parties in dialogue arrive at a more generalized and impartial
understanding of what decision or policy best takes into account the interests of all.16
Here Annan’s call for an expanded and more representative Security Council is
relevant in that the logic of deliberation is that its just outcome requires all those affected
be involved in the dialogic process. A further requirement is that all participants should
be on equal footing to prevent the phenomenon that vulnerable parties are silenced or
unduly influenced in their views by more powerful parties. In this regard, the economic
and political dominance of the United States, and more broadly that of the North (the
developed world), poses an obstacle to fair decision making.
Still, as the Security Council’s deliberations about the United States push for war
on Iraq show, this body can come to a greater degree of objectivity than is true of any
individual state, such as the United States. These same deliberations also suggest that a
doctrine of United Nations-authorized preventive war would have a lesser risk of
expanding and strengthening American hegemony than its unilateralist variant. If the
Security Council had had its way, the United States would not have succeeded in
expanding its military presence in the Middle East.
The United Nations Charter does not preclude that the Security Council
authorizes preventive war, solving the issue of international law. Chapter VII of the
Charter discusses how the Security Council may respond to “threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” The spread of WMD may be classified as
a threat to the peace. Article 41 calls for nonmilitary solutions, but Article 42 stipulates
that when these have failed an armed response by member states under the authority of
the Security Council may be warranted. Accordingly, on the assumption that non-military
solutions would fail to eliminate the treat of nations with aggressive designs acquiring

WMD or enabling terrorists to obtain WMD, the Security Council has the right to
authorize preventive war.
3. Objections to a United Nations Doctrine of Preventive War
Should we conclude then with some scholars of international relations and
security, such as Joseph Nye, that the United Nations should embrace the concept of
preventive war in response to the emerging danger of WMD falling into the wrong
hands?17 Critics from both the left and right have objected to unilateral preventive war on
basis of the principle that the world community should uphold the sovereignty of states if
they are not engaged in acts of aggression toward other states. This principle has been the
dominant policy of the United Nations since its inception and precludes Security Council
authorization of preventive war.
The international community increasingly accepting humanitarian intervention
within the international community shows that they have called the principle into
question. Annan’s request that the panel investigating preventive war also studies the
norms of collective humanitarian intervention reflects his view that claims of sovereignty
lose their force once states inflict gross human rights violations on their people.18
In defense of Annan’s view, what warrants the treatment of the state as a
sovereign entity is that the state approximates the just state as an expression of the will of
the people. Not the state as a mere legal order or instrument of power, but the state as the
collective self-determination of the people, deserves moral recognition. Humanitarian
emergencies typically involve struggles of self-determination suppressed by states. The
state no longer provides many citizens even the minimal condition of self-determination,
the protection of human life itself, and so the state loses its legitimacy and normative
claim to sovereignty. To value sovereignty as such is to value a shield behind which
brutal oppression can triumph.19
A United Nations doctrine of preventive war would mean taking an additional
step beyond the traditional standard of when sovereignty must be upheld. Considerations
of “just cause” show that we should not take this additional step. Following traditional
just war theory, a war has a just cause only as a response to some definite wrong. In the
words of Thomas Aquinas, “those against whom the war is waged deserve such a
response because of some offense on their part.”20 During the period of the colonization
of the Americas, Francisco de Vitoria made the same point, “the sole and only just cause
for waging war is when harm has been inflicted.”21 A state may engage in war in
response to an attack, but the state may not go to war to achieve some perceived good,
such as conversion, “civilizing” people, and, in our time, promoting democracy.
Humanitarian intervention has a just cause as a response to the wrong of massive
human rights violations. The aim is to prevent the wrong from occurring in its full scale,
but a military intervention is only justified if a history of rights violations exists and other
undeniable evidence exists that indicates a humanitarian disaster is about to happen.
Including narrowly defined anticipatory self-defense as a just cause is more problematic.

The wrong here is mostly about to happen, and we must acknowledge that those who
consider a preemptive strike may be mistaken about the intentions and aims of the enemy
nation. If so, they would unleash the harms of war without being a victim of an
unavoidable harm, making the war initiative an act of aggression. The risk of this
injustice becomes intolerably large in the case of preventive war against other nations
seeking to acquire WMD.
Consider nuclear weapons. No doubt, proliferation of nuclear weapons increases
tension in international affairs, but the harm done by any given state merely seeking to
acquire or obtain these weapons is too diffuse and too limited to count as a just cause. So
it must be argued, for example, that dictatorial and repressive regimes with suspected
aggressive designs cannot be entrusted with these weapons, while their possession by
established democracies is not a serious threat. This standard, though, is less than
convincing since the United States is the only state with a track record of using nuclear
weapons. It also has a history of threatening to use these weapons against both its nuclear
and non-nuclear enemies. The Bush Administration publicly has reserved the right to use
nuclear weapons against any nation attacking the United States or its allies with chemical
or biological weapons, while according to its classified but leaked Nuclear Posture
Review of January 2002, it also might be prepared to use these weapons to prevent such
attacks. Partly for this second purpose is the Bush Administration interested in
developing new and smaller nuclear weapons, increasing the likelihood of their use. 22
We could alternatively argue that since almost all states have signed the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), entered into force in 1970, it would
be a definite wrong for most states to acquire these weapons. A mere violation of this
treaty, or a withdrawal from the treaty, is not a wrong of such proportion that it would be
a just cause for war. It would be morally untenable to militarily enforce nonproliferation
as long as the NPT parties in possession of nuclear weapons ignore article 6 of this treaty,
committing them:
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.23
We should support this article because people around the world lack knowledge about the
conditions that may trigger a nuclear war, so to accept the status quo of a limited number
of nations having possession of nuclear weapons would be a mistake. Only the total
abolition of nuclear weapons could provide us with real assurance that no nation will use
these weapons.
We can make similar observations concerning biological and chemical weapons.
The world community is, in theory, committed to their abolition. But notwithstanding the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) entered into force in 1975, and the
new Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force in 1997, a dozen or so
counties that are known or strongly suspected to have programs of developing or actively

maintaining biological or chemical weapons still exist, including China, Iran, Syria,
Egypt, Israel, and North Korea.24
Again, mere acquisition is not a sufficient wrong for war, and we do not know
which nations’ development of these weapons is undeniably a great threat. What further
complicates the picture is that several nations committed to destroying their chemical
weapons (required by the CWC) still have huge stockpiles of them and that research
programs focused on defense against biological weapons (permitted by the BTWC) can
easily turn into programs with offensive purposes. Intelligence especially with regard to
biological weapons is difficult and unreliable. International teams monitoring compliance
would be helpful, but the Bush Administration has rejected international efforts to add an
inspection regime to the BTWC.25
In sum, the justification of preventive war is based on the flawed notion that we
can know which nations will inevitably commit a great wrong to other nations once they
have acquired WMD. Terms like “rogue nations” and “axis of evil” have little descriptive
and predictive value, but they make it easier, if it turns out that a preventive war was
based on a false premise, to fall back on what has been called “altruistic permissivism”
with regard to the use of military force.26 This is the view that war may be waged for the
good of the people of the other nation. The case of Iraq is instructive. Now that WMD
have not been found, some moral reason has to be provided for causing thousands of
deaths and wounded. The most common rationale offered for the war and the occupation
is that it will bring democracy, freedom, and higher living standards to people. But the
people were never asked whether they wanted to pay the price for these still elusive
benefits. Seldom noted, this reasoning blatantly contradicts the just war tradition and the
main tenet of international law concerning resort to military force: war is defensible only
to right a great wrong, not to bring about some good. Once we accept the second
standard, no significant restrictions on initiating war remain. After all, regime change
may be desirable in many, if not most, countries across the globe. The preventive war
doctrine is, to some extent, self-defeating, even if adopted by the United Nations instead
of unilaterally, in that nations may come to the decision to acquire WMD as deterrence
against counter-proliferation wars.
Another problem with United Nations authorization of preventive war is that the
current composition of the Security Council is such that its decisions will be selective,
even if more impartial than unilateral decisions. The Council would veto preventive war
against Israel or China, and obtaining its authorization for a preventive war against North
Korea would be improbable. But envisioning that the Security Council would approve of
war against Iran or Syria is easy. No impartial standard that warrants such outcomes
exists. Power politics would significantly determine preventive war authorization instead
of threat assessment alone. Perhaps the problem would become manageable once the
United Nations authorization of military force would become more democratic and less
subject to the national interests of the permanent members of the Security Council, but it
would be a mistake to argue for a United Nations preventive war doctrine now on the
basis of what the United Nations might become.

Considering the great potential harm nations with WMD might inflict on other
countries, inconsistent action, action with the risk of a wrong assessment of the threat
posed by the enemy, or even action that might contribute to proliferation, might appear to
be better than no action at all. In response, to act justly is crucial, and the risk of harm
that we must accept to avoid inflicting a great wrong is extremely high. That we initiate
war, with its great human costs and often unexpected and unintended harmful
consequences, based on the justification that in so doing we have a small, modest, or even
significant likelihood that we can prevent another nation from doing harm to us is
morally indefensible. To be morally defensible, we must have almost absolute certainty
that the potential for harm to us is imminent. This level of certainty—except in
hindsight—is typically not within our grasp.
War must be a last resort measure, which points to another major objection to a
United Nations doctrine of preventive war. I believe that most states could be effectively
discouraged from acquiring WMD through peaceful means such as conditional economic
support and negotiations. It would further help if countries of the North would cease to
support or put into power militarily and economically dictatorial regimes in the South
(the developing world), turning a blind eye to these regimes acquiring WMD as long as
they stay in line.
Even when states have acquired WMD, deterrence from employing them is still
possible. The NSS sidesteps this point by failing to differentiate between so-called rogue
states and the terrorist groups these rogue states allegedly sponsor. Correctly noting that
global terrorist groups that seek martyrdom cannot be effectively deterred, the NSS
jumps to the conclusion that rogue states cannot be effectively deterred. Iraq is not a
counterexample because the United States never tried to deter its use of chemical
weapons against Iraqi Kurds and enemy soldiers in the war with Iran.
This leaves the problem of whether United Nations-authorized preventive war
may not be necessary to avoid the risk that some state would enable global terrorists to
acquire WMD. At the outset, we should note that the NSS overstates the interests of
terrorist groups in seeking to acquire WMD and their capability to use them effectively,
creating a fear among the public conducive to the Bush Administration’s hegemonic
purposes.27
The political objectives of most terrorist groups are not well served by inflicting
many WMD-caused casualties. If they did, they would lose the public support and
sympathy needed to realize their goals. Also, many technological obstacles to creating
and using WMD effectively exist. To date, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo has been the
only non-state actor that has created and used WMD on a significant scale. Between 1990
and 1995, the cult used biological and chemical weapons on no fewer than seventeen
occasions. Only its chemical attacks were successful, the most devastating one being the
attack with the nerve agent sarin (in low-grade and impure form) on the Tokyo subway
on 20 March 1995. The attack exposed approximately 5000 people to the nerve gas,
killed 12 persons, and left hundreds with minor injuries and dozens with severe injuries.28
Horrendous as the attack may appear, the harm done was small compared to the harm that

Aum Shinrikyo could have inflicted with conventional weapons if the cult had invested
similar efforts and resources in doing so.
A strong disincentive for terrorist groups to use WMD exists in that doing so
successfully would likely lead to their destruction and the destruction of their enemies,
either because of the dangers inherent to using WMD or because of a devastating
retaliatory response. The events of 11 September 2001 give credibility to the view that
some terrorist groups might be prepared to use WMD. In political, cultural, and
geographical terms, their supportive audience may be far removed from the location of
their destructive act. They may not care about their survival. So the issue we need to
address is how a terrorist group seeking to obtain WMD with the assistance of some state
might materialize, keeping in mind that most terrorist groups will not seek to pursue this
course of action.
One possibility is that some state with WMD will provide these weapons to global
terrorists harbored in another state, or that this state might welcome terrorists within its
borders and then provide them with WMD. Waging war against a state suspected of
planning to act in one of these ways would be a preventive war, and it would be a wrong
war because the anticipated harm is too speculative and doubtful to count as a definite
wrong and so as a just cause. Since tracing the source of WMD used by global terrorists
would be fairly easy, concealing complicity would be nearly impossible. The risk of
incurring retaliation deters states from providing such weapons to terrorists. The greater
risk is that global terrorists, through force, theft, or deception, acquire WMD materials
from states with nuclear weapons, civilian stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or
plutonium, biodefense programs, stockpiles of chemical weapons, and the like. The
solution includes greater security, stricter control regimes, a more rapid destruction of all
chemical weapons (as required by the CWC), curtailment of biodefense, the elimination
of fissile material from civilian nuclear programs, and, ultimately, the elimination of all
nuclear weapons.
Another possibility is that a state sponsoring or harboring global terrorists is
assisting these terrorists in acquiring WMD capabilities. Again, this scenario is not likely
to occur because any state engaging in such conduct knows that the probable outcome is
war. War in this case would not be a preventive war but a defensive war because a state
targeted by global terrorists has a just cause to go to war with states that actively protect
these terrorists. A state may remain neutral in a conflict that spills over on its territory,
but a state cannot legitimately demand neutrality when it actively supports a warring
group.29 In most situations, initiating war would be wrong because other alternatives
might be available for addressing the harm done, such as pressuring the country to turn
the terrorists over to the courts.
Significantly, a justified war, following the just war tradition, must satisfy the
principle of proportionality, and extending the war on terrorism to a war on states would
generally not satisfy this principle. The principle requires that the expected costs of war
are proportionate to its anticipated benefits. Estimating the costs of war is difficult since
it often has many unexpected consequences. The benefits of waging war against states to

combat terrorism are also difficult to ascertain in that the goal of getting rid of terrorists
in a given country might appear successful, but terrorists can regroup in different
countries or new terrorists can be recruited. War may motivate new volunteers. Overall,
the harm generated by war between states will typically outweigh the harm that terrorists
will inflict, and so it would be wrong to go war with states that sponsor terrorists.
The Bush doctrine sets aside considerations of proportionality in suggesting that
we have no need to distinguish between sponsoring states and terrorists as potential
targets of military force. Only one situation exists in which the proportionality principle
definitely tilts towards war: when the sponsoring state enables the terrorists to acquire
WMD. Even so, we should not exaggerate the dangers of WMD in the hands of terrorists
abroad by ignoring the problem of effective delivery systems needed for creating largescale human destruction. Prior to extending the war from the terrorists to the sponsoring
state, the United States government would have ample time to seek Security Council
authorization and submit the case for war to the world court of opinion.
4. WMD and United States Military Hegemony
In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Annan distinguished
between “hard” and “soft” threats. The first are the threats of terrorism and WMD; the
second are the threats to peace and security posed by the persistence of poverty, income
inequalities across the globe, the spread of communicable diseases, environmental
destruction, and the like. Annan called on the United Nations to deal with both threats,
arguing that both tasks are related. He continued: “We now see, with chilling clarity, that
a world where many millions of people endure brutal oppression and extreme misery will
never be fully secure, even for its most privileged inhabitants.”30
We would be hard pressed to disagree with Annan. The NSS acknowledges a
similar point by observing that “poverty does not make poor people into terrorists,” but
“poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist
networks.”31 Yet, the NSS offers little in terms of how poverty, weak states, and other
social conditions conducive to terrorism and violent conflict can be eliminated. The
emphasis is on the military response, and so are the commitments of the Bush
Administration.
Since 11 September 2001, the United States has followed a course of building up
its military and developing new weapons programs, while peace efforts and resources
assigned for reducing “soft threats” remain relatively minuscule. The United States
spends close to half of the world’s military expenditures, and it spends about thirty times
as much as the states that it has declared at one point or another to be rogue states,
including Syria, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan.32
The increasing United States military hegemony is a crucial factor in the spread of
WMD. Theorists frequently espouse that terrorism emerges in situations of asymmetric
conflict. The terrorist, the underdog, sets aside the rules of war, and fights dirty, in the
anticipation that it will be effective against the militarily much stronger opponent.33 What

adds to the use of terrorist methods by non-state actors is that the United States has a long
history of terrorist actions, ranging from the bombing of civilian centers to supporting
covert actions against dissenting civilians.
Less often noted is that states may seek to acquire WMD in response to United
States military hegemony. The NSS acknowledges the point to some extent. After stating
that rogue states see WMD as “tools of intimidation and military aggression against their
neighbors,” the NSS observes that these weapons may be acquired with the intent to deter
the United States from responding to these aggressions. The NSS continues, “Such states
also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of
the United States.”34
We cannot fully understand even the current use and popularity of the phrase
WMD without reference to United States military hegemony. Current international
security literature commonly defines WMDs as biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons.35 The Bush Administration and the media popularized the term with the same
meaning especially in the months before the war against Iraq in 2003.
Why are these three types of weapons grouped together as weapons of mass
destruction? True, nuclear weapons stand out due to their enormous destructive potential,
but many chemical and biological weapons are less destructive than some conventional
weapons. Alternatively, the indiscriminate nature of these three types of weapons might
appear to warrant the WMD label, but many other weapons are similarly indiscriminate,
inevitably killing large numbers of civilians. We do not call economic sanctions WMD.
Yet the economic sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s claimed hundreds of thousands
of lives because the sanctions restricted the import of water purification equipment,
medical equipment, drugs, and the like, and created food shortages.36 Depleted uranium,
land mines, and cluster bombs are not included, even though they have left behind
countless dead children and civilians. The United States is developing space weapons
such as space-based lasers, negating several United Nations resolutions calling for use of
space for peaceful purposes only.37 We can predict that most people will never call these
weapons WMD, but they can be equally destructive.
All this suggests that the notion of WMD in its current use is partly ideologically
tainted. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are grouped together and popularized
as WMD because the United States views their acquisition by countries from the South as
a (varying) challenge to its military superiority. Nuclear weapons can fulfill this role due
to their sheer destructive potential alone, while biological and chemical weapons pose a
challenge because they are difficult to detect and have a surprise and unpredictable
element in their potential application.
To stop the proliferation of WMD, then, will require that the United States ends
its military build-up, because the more the United States seeks to assert its military
superiority the more its pushes countries resisting this hegemony toward developing
WMD.38 Instead of seeking to articulate standards of preventive war, the United Nations
would do better to focus on the problem of how the organization can be effective and able

to contribute to global democracy and peace in the face of increasing United States
military hegemony and the new weapons that the United States is developing for this
purpose.
5. Postscript
The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, formed by Annan after
his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, issued its report A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility (MSW) in December 2004.39 In accordance with my
arguments here, that report rejects the legality and morality of unilateral preventive war
and objects to any weakening of article 51 of the United Nations Charter to accommodate
a broader notion of self-defense. In accordance with my view, MSW also offers valuable
non-military recommendations for dealing with the threat of the spread of WMD among
states or terrorist groups, such as: the current nuclear weapon states should move toward
disarmament in accordance with the NPT; negotiations should be renewed among parties
to the BTWC concerning a verification protocol; and we must reduce poverty and
promote democracy and human and political rights so as to diminish fertile breeding
grounds for terrorism.40
In opposition to my view, MSW favors a collective preventive military response to
meet the threat posed by the spread of WMD among terrorists and some states. The Panel
rightly maintains the Security Council has the authority under Chapter VII to declare a
preventive war, but it wrongly continues to claim that the Security Council must prepare
for this option in our present situation:
In the world of the twenty-first century, the international community does have to be
concerned about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, weapons of mass
destruction and irresponsible States, and much more besides, which may conceivably
justify the use of force, not just reactively but preventively and before a latent threat
becomes imminent. . . . The Council may well need to be prepared to be much more
proactive on these issues, taking more decisive action earlier, than it has been in the
past.41
MSW here makes the same error as the NSS in failing the distinguish between a
variety of scenarios in which military force might be used against states or terrorist
groups seeking to acquire WMD, only some of which would be properly characterized as
preventive war. Lack of accuracy invites abuse of preventive military force, or fear of
such abuse, and so collective security would be reduced if the Security Council adopted
the Panel’s preventive war doctrine.
Other objections to the doctrine as espoused by the Panel are:
(1) the problem of inaccurate intelligence concerning WMD programs is not solved;
(2) no attempt is made to define “irresponsible States” (an apparent euphemism for
the “rogues states” referred to in the NSS); and

(3) the document fails to explain why deterrence against “irresponsible States” that
have acquired WMD might not be effective.
MSW addresses only one objection raised in my paper against a United Nations
preventive war doctrine, the Security Council, due to its composition, lacks the capability
to make objective decisions about when preventive war might be warranted.
The Panel proposes two models for expanding the Council: they have in common
that all major regions in the world would be equally represented with a total of twentyfour members, while the number of countries with veto power would remain the same.42
It will be difficult to realize this proposal, and in the meantime preventive war decisions
by the Security Council will be highly selective.
Finally, MSW proposes that the Security Council and all United Nations Member
States use the following “five basic criteria of legitimacy” in considering when to
authorize the use of military force in general: “seriousness of threat,” “proper purpose,”
“last resort,” “proportional means,” and “balance of consequences.”43 The second and
third of these criteria correspond to the traditional jus ad bellum (“right to war”)
principles of “right intention” and “last resort,” while the fourth and fifth combine the
principles of “proportionality” and “reasonable chance of success.” The jus ad bellum
principle of “legitimate authority” is not mentioned, understandably so, because MSW
assumes that the United Nations Charter answers the question of where right authority is
to be located. The second through fifth criteria constitute significant constraints on the
authorization of military force, if properly applied.
The problem with the Panel’s list of criteria is the standard of “seriousness of
threat.” It replaces “just cause” in just war theory with the standard that force may be
warranted when a state is seriously threatened. This substitution is quite broad and vague
and allows so much leeway in its application that its general acceptance would lead us to
a less secure world.
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